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Summary: Counterfeit electronic components in military systems raise costs and 
endanger lives.  Because the United States Military requires millions of replacement 
parts, many of which are no longer manufactured, their entrance into critical supply 
chains is seemingly inexorable.  My work attempts to understand the mechanisms feeding 
materials to counterfeiters and establishes future research goals as well as corrective steps 
to better understand and mitigate counterfeit components emanating from Asia. 
 
Andrew holds a J.D., cum laude from New York University 
School of Law and an A.B., magna cum laude, from 
Washington University in St. Louis. While an Associate at 
Skadden, Arps Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Andrew 
advised clients on a range of business and litigation 
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Toward More Reliable Sourcing:  
Combatting Counterfeit Electronic Components in the 
United States Department of Defense Supply Chain 
KEY INSIGHTS 
1. Key electronic components manufacturing countries, such as Malaysia, 
have an abundance components discarded from the manufacturing 
process.  Falling scrap prices provide financial incentives for e-waste 
recyclers to sell discarded components to counterfeiters rather than 
engage in materials recovery. 
2. Re-aligning the e-waste recyclers’ financial incentives with those of 
legitimate interests through component re-certification programs as 
well as other recycling projects can help reduce the supply of discarded 
components available to counterfeiters.   
3. Reduced supply of discarded components and increasing availability of 
legitimately re-certified components can hinder counterfeiters’ 
businesses and improve overall supply chain reliability without relying 
solely upon costly, time-consuming, and possibly ineffective point-of-
receipt inspections. 
 
Introduction & Background  
In May 2012, the United States Senate 
Committee on Armed Services revealed 
that roughly 1,000,000 counterfeit 
electronic components made their way into 
the United States Department of Defense 
supply chain from 2009-2010 and, worse, 
that some were installed in critical 
platforms such as THAAD missile defense 
systems.  Counterfeit electronic 
components are used parts   resold as 
“new” or are altered to appear as higher-
grade items than they actually are.  Images 
1 & 2 show an integrated circuit that 
appears to have been counterfeited.  At 
best, counterfeit electronic components are 
a form of fraud while, at worst, their 
suppliers are stealing United States 
taxpayer dollars while simultaneously 
endangering the lives of U.S. military 
personnel and ultimately U.S. national 
security.  U.S. Government publications 
from the last 5-8 years have noted the 
problem and highlighted the increasing 
incidence of counterfeit components.  
Congress and President Obama recently 
ordered the Department of Defense to 
eradicate these malignant components 
from the United States’ critical supply 
chains by passing the National Defense 
Authorization Act in January 2013.  It is 
imperative that the U.S. Government now 
takes proactive steps to implement this 
mandate.  The question, of course, is how. 
 
Presently, many people have offered 
“fence solutions.”  I use the term “fence 
solution” to refer to any technique 
designed to keep counterfeits out, usually 
via screening, rather than approaches that 
address the problem’s root causes.  Most 
counterfeit electronic components come 
from Asia, particularly China.  But, of 
course, even counterfeiters must source 
raw materials to produce their wares.  
Electronic waste (discarded components 
and electronic equipment) is the raw 
material used by counterfeiters to produce 
knock-off parts.  Therefore, if we can 
reduce the supply of discarded components 
presently available to counterfeiters, we 
can combat counterfeits at their source, 
rather than on American soil. 
 
 
Image 1: Part # AD677KR 
Source: Erai, Inc. Counterfeits Database 
 
Image 2: Part # AD677KR (Acetone swab removes 
markings) 
Source: Erai, Inc. Counterfeits Database 
 
Research & Analysis 
Because there is very little research on the 
e-waste business as it relates to counterfeit 
components, I conducted structured 
interviews over the course of six months to 
explore the workings and incentives that 
drive e-waste vendors to sell components 
to counterfeiters.  I interviewed several 
industry participants and attended talks by 
others to gain a broad understanding of the 
business as well as a detailed 
understanding of how legitimate and 
illegitimate e-waste transactions work. 
 
I found that integrated circuits (IC) – a 
type of semiconductor – are usually the 
most valuable and are therefore highly 
sought after by counterfeiters.  Malaysia 
produced 164.9 billion integrated circuits 
from 2008-2012, of which roughly 1.5% (a 
very conservative estimate) are discarded 
as rejected or obsolete.  These discards are 
special though because they are “high 
quality.”  That is, they are unused and 
therefore will be in better condition, 
making them more difficult to detect later.  
Accordingly, such e-waste poses an 
especially high risk to DoD supply chains.   
 
Relying upon public data, I found that the 
average Malaysian IC sells in legitimate 
wholesale ecommerce for RM 0.585 
(roughly $0.19 USD) per piece.  Based on 
my interviews, I estimate that a discarded 
IC sells for half that (RM0.2925 per piece).   
 
Meanwhile, of the 1.1 million tons of e-
waste generated in Malaysia each year, 
roughly 75% is unaccounted for.  This is 
unsurprising given the falling precious 
metal concentration in electronic 
components, a response to rising materials 
cost, that has lead to reduced value in 
reclaiming metal from e-waste.  Many 
operators in western nations address this 
problem by charging their clients a fee for 
e-waste removal.  This, however, is not the 
practice in Asia and, therefore, the 
situation leaves substantial opportunity for 
counterfeiters to procure discarded 
components from e-waste vendors. 
 
 
Figure 1: “Sherwood Plot”, a graph that shows the 
concentration at which virgin ore can be 
profitably mined.  This allows for rapid 
assessment as to whether a metal is enriched or 
diluted in a component as compared to its original 
source. 
Source: (Johnson, 2007 – reprinted there with permission 
of the National Academy of Sciences) 
Data uncovered through the interviews 
reveals that a small e-waste operator can 
easily earn RM10,000 per month by selling 
just a few key components to 
counterfeiters.  Meanwhile, a corrupt 
vendor can earn substantially more, even 
millions of ringgit, by systematically 
procuring and selling discarded 
components.  Indeed, based upon publicly 
available data, the Malaysian market for 
discarded ICs is likely in the neighborhood 
of RM 200 million per year.  With only 
about 30 e-waste companies operating in 
Malaysia, the financial incentive to skip 
the scrapping and instead sell to 
counterfeiters is clear. 
 
Solutions 
“Fence solutions” can only go so far, to 
truly solve the counterfeits problem, we 
must address its root cause: financial 
incentives.  Electronic components, and 
ICs in particular, have tremendous value in 
secondary markets where governments and 
large businesses turn to procure 
replacement components for legacy 
systems.  So, instead of having an e-waste 
recycler or other business sell to 
counterfeiters or suspect parties, we should 
establish a system where reliable, 
independent third-parties can certify that 
discarded, but new, parts are still in fact 
good parts capable of reliable use in 
certain applications.  Furthermore, we can 
find other recycling uses for e-waste – 
something at least one Malaysian vendor is 
already doing – and, in this way, re-align 
their financial incentives with those of 
legitimate interests and thereby reduce the 
supply of “high quality” discarded 
electronic components available to 
counterfeiters. 
